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Asset-Backed Securities
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 22, 2010, as a flourish from President Obama's pen
enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Ford Motor Credit Company LLC
(Ford Credit) sent a letter to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) stating that several credit rating agencies were
unwilling to consent to inclusion of their ratings in any registration
statements or prospectuses.2 The rating agencies solicited by Ford
Credit were unwilling to consent to inclusion of their rating
because of Dodd-Frank's rescission of SEC Rule 436(G), which
had previously shielded rating agencies from civil liability as an
expert under Section 11 of the Securities Act for inaccurate
ratings used in registration statements. Because Ford Credit was
unable to obtain any nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations' (NRSROs)' consent to include their ratings, Ford
Credit was unable to comply with Rules 1103(a)(9) and 1220 of
1. Jesse Lee, President Obama Signs Wall Street Reform: "No Easy Task," THE
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 21, 2010, 2:22 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/07/21/president-obama-signs-wall-street-
reform-no-easy-task.
2. Ford Motor Credit Company LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 2882538
(July 22, 2010) [hereinafter July SEC No-Action Letter].
3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 939G, 124 Stat. 1376, 1890 (2010).
4. See Securities Act of 1933 §11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006) (holding an
expert, consenting to be named as such in a registration statement, liable for any
untrue statement of a material fact or failure to include a material fact necessary so as
not to make a statement misleading. Also, requires an expert to make a reasonable
investigation as to whether or not that portion of the registration statement they have
certified has a basis in fact).
5. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE: Nov. 2009
AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES RELATING TO THE OVERSIGHT OF NATIONALLY
RECOGNIZED STAT. RATING ORGS. 1, http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/34-61050-
secg-nrsro.htm (last modified Feb. 3, 2010).
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Regulation AB, "which requires the disclosure of NRSROs and
their ratings in securities registration documentation."6  In
response to Ford Credit's letter, the SEC issued a no-action letter7
until January 24, 2011, granting NRSROs a six-month period to
determine how best to comply with the new legislation." The SEC
provided the six-month grace period to issuers and rating agencies
so that they may not only continue offering asset-backed
securities, but also take time to weigh their new exposure to
liability before the SEC no-action letter expires on January 24,
2011.9 In a November 23, 2010 letter, the SEC officially extended
its no-action position to give NRSROs time to contemplate and
complete the regulatory actions mandated by the Dodd-Frank so
that asset-backed security offerings can continue in the registered
marketplace without interruption.o
This Note will assess the negative effects on securities
markets from increased liability for credit rating agencies
following the passage of Dodd-Frank.n Dodd-Frank eliminates
SEC Rule 436(G),12 which had previously exempted agency ratings
from "expert" status under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933
when rating a security." Section 11 establishes liability for certain
experts who have "prepared or certified" part of a false or
14misleading registration statement. Eliminating this provision will
increase rating agency exposure to litigation from unhappy
investors who relied on inaccurate ratings to their financial
6. Stephen Joyce, Dodd-Frank Impact on Rating Agencies Includes Expanded
Liability, SEC Authority, BNA BANKING DAILY, Aug. 30, 2010, available at 2010 WL
3378807.
7. July SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 2.
8. Joyce, supra note 6.
9. See James Hamilton, SEC Clarifies Dodd-Frank's Effects on Rule 436(g), JIM
HAMILTON'S WORLD OF SECURITIES REGULATION (Jul. 28, 2010, 1:36 PM),
http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2010/07/sec-responds-quickly-to-concerns-
over.html.
10. Ford Motor Credit Company LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, WL 2882538
(Nov. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Nov. SEC Order].
11. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 939G, 124 Stat. 1376, 1890 (2010).
12. Id.
13. See Securities Act of 1933 §11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
14. See id. at § 11(a)(4).
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detriment."5 Similar to Ford Credit, many issuers of securities are
now unable to obtain the ratings needed to put financial products
on the market as rating agencies assess their new legal liability. 6
Although the SEC no-action letter buys some time for the rating
agencies, they will need to come up with a means to shield
themselves from civil liability should the SEC rescind its no-action
position in the near future." This Note will analyze the negative
effects that heightened liability for NRSROs would have on
investment in asset-backed securities and potential responses from
large investment banks - the primary issuers of these complex
financial products - and the rating agencies who rate their
products.
Part II of this Note provides an overview of the history of
credit rating agencies and the regulatory treatment of these
agencies by the federal government.' 9 It will also discuss the First
Amendment protections that courts extend to credit ratings used
in financial offering registration statements.20 Part III highlights
the role that inaccurate credit ratings of mortgage-backed
securities played in the recent subprime mortgage crisis. Part III
also discusses ethical breaches by credit rating agencies that cut
corners when rating complex financial products.22  It then
addresses the conflicts of interest between rating agencies and
institutional investors - rating agencies' primary customers and
sources of revenue.23 Part IV assesses the origination and Dodd-
Frank rescission of Rule 436(G).24 This Part will also discuss how
rating agencies are reacting to this new legislation in the short-
15. See John Lippert, Credit Ratings Can't Claim Free Speech in Law Giving New




18. See Mendy Piekarski, Recent Development, Developments in Banking Law:
2007-2008: II. Ratings Agency Accountability, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 272, 273
(2008).
19. See infra Part H.A.
20. See infra Part HI.B.
21. See infra Part III.A-B.
22. See infra Part II.C.
23. See infra Part III.D.
24. See infra Part IV.A.
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term." Part V analyzes the ramifications of these new laws for
credit rating agencies and what can be done to ensure financial
markets remain healthy in our recovering economy.26 This Part
also indicates some of the unintended, paralyzing effects the
rescission of SEC Rule 436(G) could have on financial markets.7
Finally, this Part analyzes the SEC regulatory oversight sanctioned
within Dodd-Frank, concluding that increased regulatory oversight
is a viable method to increase investor protection, rather than
imposing liability on NRSROs for inaccurate credit ratings.28
II. HISTORICAL INDUSTRY PRACTICES AND REGULATION OF
NRSROs
A. Overview of Credit Rating Agencies
Credit rating agencies began providing rating services to
financial markets in the early twentieth century by supplying
investors with opinions on the creditworthiness of corporate
bonds.29  As financial markets grew in complexity, credit rating
agencies broadened their rating services to include "municipal
bonds, mortgage backed securities, and other structured finance
bonds. ,30
Credit ratings provide investors with an indication of the
likelihood that a given debt obligation will be repaid as well as the
expected loss in the event of a default.' A credit rating agency
issues credit ratings using qualitative and quantitative models and
receives fees for its services from issuers, investors, or other
25. See infra Part IV.C.
26. See infra Part V.
27. See infra Part V.A-C.
28. See infra Part V.D.
29. Caitlin M. Mulligan, From AAA to F: How the Credit Rating Agencies Failed
America and What Can Be Done To Protect Investors, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1275, 1279
(2009).
30. Kia Dennis, The Ratings Game: Explaining Rating Agency Failures in the
Build Up to the Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1117 (2009).
31. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, CREDIT RATINGS AND THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS 4 (2010), available at http://www.fcic.gov/resource/reports/ (follow "Credit
Ratings and The Financial Crisis (PDF)" hyperlink) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT]
(finding that Standard and Poor's and Fitch base ratings on probability of default,
while Moody's bases it's ratings on expected loss).
114 [Vol. 15
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market participants.32  Moody's Investor Services, Standard and
Poors's, and Fitch Ratings, collectively termed the "Big Three,"
largely dominate the credit rating market.33 Credit rating agencies
are registered with, and regulated by, the SEC as NRSROs. 4
With the passage of the Banking Act of 1935, the Federal
government formally enmeshed the ratings agencies with the
regulation of banks." As ratings became increasingly entrenched
within securities regulations, credit rating agencies evolved from
providers of credit information into regulatory licensing agents of
the federal government.36 Rating agencies developed into
regulatory "gatekeepers" of financial markets because federal law
requires a credit rating for many financial products." For many
investors, credit ratings restrict the types of investments they may
purchase. But, as government increased its reliance on NRSRO
credit ratings in regulating financial products, direct regulation of
the rating agencies was virtually non-existent; despite warnings
from periodic financial crises in which rating agencies downgraded
32. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(61) [West
2010].
33. See Kathleen L. Casey, Comm'r, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the
Commission Open Meeting (Dec. 3, 2008),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spchl20308klc.htm#P23_2884 (remarking that,
as of December 2008, the "Big Three" issue approximately 98% of all ratings and
amass over 90% of the revenues within the ratings industry); Mulligan, supra note 29,
at 1279 (stating that Moody's, Standard and Poor's and Fitch are collectively termed
the "Big Three," issuing over ninety-eight percent of all ratings).
34. See Small Entity Compliance Guide: Nov. 2009 Amendments to the Rules
Relating to the Oversight of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/34-61050-secg-
nrsro.htm (last modified Feb. 3, 2010).
35. See Dennis, supra note 30, at 1117 (stating that the Banking Act of 1935
mandated that national banks were now limited to purchasing investment-grade
securities, that is, those that are not primarily speculative investments) (quoting
FRANK PARTNOY, THE PARADOX OF CREDIT RATINGS, IN RATINGS, RATING
AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65, 71 (2002)).
36. FRANK PARTNOY, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, RETHINKING
REGULATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: AN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
PERSPECTIVE 2 (2009), available at
http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/CRAWhitePaper04-14-09.pdf ("A regulatory license
is a key that unlocks the financial markets.").
37. See F. Phillip Hosp, Problems and Reforms in Mortgage-Backed Securities:
Handicapping the Credit Rating Agencies, 79 MIss. L.J. 531, 540-41 (2010).
38. See id. at 540-541 (explaining that government regulations require that certain
institutional investors such as pension funds, money market funds, insurance
companies, and banks may only hold securities rated investment-grade).
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their ratings just before a collapse - suggesting the ratings were
inaccurate in the first place.39
In 1975, the Net Capital Rule was revised to allow banks to
base their capital requirements on the quality of the securities they
held by subjecting them to lower capital requirements if those
securities were rated investment-grade by at least two NRSROs.4
Aligning capital margin requirements with ratings cemented
NRSROs as de facto gatekeepers of U.S. financial markets.41
Preceding the passage of the Credit Rating Agency Reform
Act of 2006 (CRARA),4 2 the government possessed virtually no
regulatory power over NRSRO operations.43 In clarifying the
NRSRO designation, the SEC instituted a clearer NRSRO
application process, which simply encouraged disclosure of rating
agency methodologies rather than permitting the SEC to
aggressively regulate NRSRO practices."
B. First Amendment Protection of Ratings Shields Credit Rating
Agencies from Liability
Until the passage of Dodd-Frank, credit rating agencies
45
enjoyed First Amendment protection of their ratings as opinions.
Thus, they were shielded from civil suits brought by aggrieved
investors who relied to their detriment on a misleading rating in
purchasing a financial product that was later downgraded or shown
to be erroneous.4 Standard & Poor's corporate website stresses
39. See Amadou N.R. Sy, The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and
Rated Markets 5-6 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 09/129, 2009), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09129.pdf.
40. Mulligan, supra note 29, at 1278 n.24 (stating that an investment-grade rating
is a rating that reflects a higher opinion on the creditworthiness of debtor or
obligation rated. Investment-grade ratings are those rated BBB or higher, while
speculative-grade ratings are BB and lower).
41. See id. at 1281.
42. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat.
1327 (2006) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a).
43. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 31, at 9.
44. Id.
45. See Lisbeth Freeman, Note, Who's Guarding the Gate? Credit-Rating Agency
Liability as "Control Person" in the Subprime Credit Crisis, 33 VT. L. REv. 585, 604
(2009).
46. See Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Investors Services, Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 526
(6th Cir. 2006) ("The actual-malice standard requires the plaintiff to prove that the
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that their ratings are "forward-looking opinions" that assess credit
and default risk.47
In Compuware, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that Moody's rating was an opinion and the standard to recover for
breach of contract is "actual malice," that is, proof that "the
defendant made the statement with knowledge of its falsity or with
reckless disregard of its truth."4 The high threshold of the "actual
malice" standard explains why the courts generally rule in favor of
the rating agency in ratings related litigation.49 In Abu Dhabi
Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York recognized typical
First Amendment protections for NRSRO credit ratings because
they are matters of public concern.o The court found, however,
that First Amendment protections for rating agencies may be
unavailable when rating information is made available only to a
small group of investors rather than to the general public -
reasoning that these protections are not available for ratings
intended for a discrete business audience, making them no longer
a matter of public concern, and therefore unprotected." Thus,
even before the Dodd-Frank rescission of SEC Rule 436(G),
rating agencies could still lose the First Amendment protection of
their ratings as opinions in certain instances.5 2
defendant made the statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard
of its truth.").
47. Credit Rating Definitions & FAQs, STANDARD & POOR'S,
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/definitions-and-faqs/en/us (last visited
Nov. 22, 2010) [hereinafter STANDARD AND POOR'S Definitions].
48. Compuware, 499 F.3d at 526.
49. Mulligan, supra note 29, at 1296, 1297 & n.163; See Compuware 499 F.3d at
526.
50. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 651 F.Supp. 2d
155, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
51. Abu Dhabi, 651 F.Supp. 2d at 176 (finding that ratings were not made
publicly available, but rather, were provided in connection with a private placement
to a select group of institutional investors). Compare In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters.,
Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F.Supp. 2d 630, 640 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (refusing to apply the First
Amendment where Moody's ratings had been disseminated to a "select class of
institutional investors"), with Compuware, 499 F.3d at 525 (applying the First
Amendment where Moody's had rated a publicly-held corporation).
52. See, e.g., In re IBM Corp. Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 109 (2nd Cir. 1998) ("[A]n
opinion may still be actionable if the speaker does not genuinely and reasonably
believe it or if it is without basis in fact.").
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C. Structuring and Rating of Mortgage-Backed Securities
Traditionally, an individual could finance the purchase of a
home with a mortgage by borrowing money from a lending
institution that carried the mortgage as an asset on its balance
sheet." Lenders began pooling mortgages and then selling the
pool of mortgage loans to a special purpose vehicle (SPV). 54 To
profit from the purchase, the SPV organized the mortgage pool
into separate levels, or tranches, based on the underlying risk of
the mortgages within the pool,55 and then sold shares from each of
these tranches to investors based on the investor's individual risk
preference. The tranches allow investors to take advantage of a
type of credit enhancement called "subordination," which creates
a "hierarchy of loss absorption among the tranche securities.""
This organizational structure ensures that any losses from interest
or principal within the pool are first allocated to the lowest-rated
18tranche. Once the lowest tranche loses all of its principal, the
losses will be allocated to the next to lowest tranche.59 This
process continues all the way through the pool, with the highest
rated tranche remaining safe from losses until all lower tranches
have fully absorbed all prior losses of principal.6 Collateralized
Debt Obligations (CDOs) are structured similarly to mortgage-
backed securities, except CDOs may actively manage their pool to
allow their underlying assets to change over time.6'
To rate one of these structured financial products, the
ratings agency receives data on the security being offered by the
53. Freeman, supra note 45, at 589.
54. See generally Hosp, supra note 37, at 543 (explaining the structure and
function of mortgage-backed securities).
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. STAFF OF THE OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS Div.
OF TRADING AND MKTS. AND OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N
SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COM'N STAFF'S EXAMINATIONS OF
SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 6 (2008),
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexaminationO7O808.pdf [hereinafter SEC
SUMMARY REPORT].
58. See Sy, supra note 39, at 16.
59. SEC SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 57, at 6.
60. See Sy, supra note 39, at 16.
61. SEC SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 57, at 7.
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issuer, as well as information and data on the issuer itself.62 The
rating agency will then make a determination on likely future
performance of the mortgage pool as a whole by assessing default
risk levels associated with each tranche level using past market
data and varying stress tests.63 A rating analyst then evaluates
quantitative and qualitative qualities of each tranche of the pool
by assessing the tranche payment schedule structure and ensuring
that the security can produce sufficient cash flow from the assets in
the pool to meet the expectations of investors in the product.6
Rating analysts then present their findings and recommended
ratings of each tranche to a ratings committee comprised of other
analysts who vote on the ratings to be assigned to each tranche
within the mortgage pool. 5
This overview of the ratings process presents a theoretical
model of how the ratings process is supposed to work.
Insufficient oversight by the SEC, however, led many rating
agencies to cut corners in making rating determinations for
complex financial products - an issue that will be discussed in
further detail in subpart III.C.1
III. How INFLATED RATINGS FOR SUBPRIME MORTGAGE-BACKED
SECURITIES CONTRIBUTED TO THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS
A. How Inflated Credit Ratings Contributed to the Financial Crisis
Credit rating agencies gave inaccurately high ratings to
many asset-backed securities, most notably, securities backed by
subprime mortgages.6 Instead of analyzing default risk with
62. See Hosp, supra note 37, at 546 (highlighting that issuer data will give general
background, investment strategy, systems of operation and historical performance
information. Security data contains information about the loans within the SPV,
including but not limited to: amount of principal, geographical location of the
secured property, borrower credit history, type of loan, and the ratio of loan amount
to property value).
63. See id. (explaining that stress tests put the assets backing the security under
various simulated market conditions to help determine likelihood of default).
64. SEC SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 57, at 7-8.
65. Hosp, supra note 37, at 547-48.
66. See id. at 546.
67. See infra Part III.C.
68. Piekarski, supra note 18, at 272.
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current data, investors discovered that rating agencies were using
archaic information and default rate models that failed to account
for higher default rates associated with the increased securitization
of subprime mortgage products; this lent minimal to no predictive
value toward making default-risk assessments.69 These inaccurate
ratings led to inflated investor confidence and accelerated demand
for mortgage-backed securities.'o Regulatory dependence on
ratings generated record profits for NRSROs during the subprime
mortgage crisis, despite progressively insufficient analysis as the
financial products they rated became increasingly complex.7' This
paradox is mainly attributable to a lack of regulatory oversight and
accountability, which could have helped to ensure that credit
rating agencies took greater care and caution in assigning their
ratings to complex financial products.72
Inflated ratings on mortgage-backed securities, especially
subprime mortgage-backed securities, led to investor
overconfidence in the creditworthiness of these complex financial
products.7 ' Lenders traditionally avoided extending mortgages to
subprime borrowers due to their higher risk of default; but as
buyers lined up to purchase and package them as securities,
original lenders sought to maximize their revenue by making more
subprime home loans than ever before.74 Investors who trusted the
ratings became complacent in making independent assessments of
the default risk associated with the financial products they
purchased." Generally, most investors just trusted the letter grade
69. See Interview with Adam Davidson, Int'l Bus. and Econ. Correspondent,
NPR, This American Life Episode Transcript, Program #355 (May 9, 2008)
[hereinafter Interview with Adam Davidson], available at
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/sites/default/files/355_transcript.pdf; Dennis, supra
note 30, at 1124-26 ("Most rating agencies relied upon loan data from 1992 through
2000 in estimating the probability of default and expected magnitude of losses from
subprime loans in a given pool. Using this information to estimate more recent
subprime mortgages, however, leads to unjustifiably low loss expectations .....
70. See Piekarski, supra note 18, at 272.
71. PARTNOY, supra note 36, at 5 ("Moody's profit margins were higher than the
margins of any other company in the S&P 500 for five consecutive years in the early
2000s.").
72. See id.
73. See Mulligan, supra note 29, at 1289.
74. See Claire A. Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job Rating
Subprime Securities?, 71 U. PITT. L. REv. 585, 590 (2010).
75. See Gretchen Morganton, BB? AAA? Disclosure Tells Us More, N.Y. TIMES,
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rating, looking primarily to rating agencies for informational
guidance for which products were safe bets.7 Reasonable or not,
the reality is that investors relied heavily on NRSRO credit ratings
7in making their investment decisions. Part of investor over-
reliance on credit ratings stems from the growing complexity of the
financial products offered in the present market.78 In Abu Dhabi
Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., the court
concluded that the plaintiff, a sophisticated institutional investor,
adequately pled reasonable reliance on Moody's and Standard &
Poor's credit ratings.79 The court based its finding on widespread
market reliance on the accuracy of credit ratings from NRSROs
and rating agency access to non-public information that even
sophisticated investors, such as the plaintiff, could not obtain.80
The regulatory entrenchment of rating agencies forces market
participants to rely on NRSRO ratings, even though they possess
limited means to perform their own due diligence concerning how
or why a particular rating was assigned.' Investor dependency on
credit ratings necessitates heightened accountability and
transparency in the methods used by ratings agencies when
determining the default risks of financial products.82
B. Effects of NRSRO Reluctance to Downgrade Ratings
Federal regulators should have been on alert that
something was awry with the rating agencies in 2001, as rating
agencies waited to downgrade Enron's credit rating until four days
before it filed for bankruptcy. Despite public outcry against the
Sept. 5, 2010, at BU1, available at 2010 WLNR 17660364.
76. See Interview with Adam Davidson, supra note 69.
77. See Concept Release on Possible Rescission of Rule 436(g) Under the
Securities Act of 1933, 74 Fed. Reg. 53114, 53117 (proposed Oct. 15, 2009)
[hereinafter 2009 SEC Concept Release].
78. See Mulligan, supra note 29, at 1289 (explaining that many structured
financial products, such as CDOs or credit default swaps, are so complex that even
many institutional investors are not sure exactly how they work).
79. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 651 F.Supp. 2d
155, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
80. Id.
81. See Hosp, supra note 37, at 567.
82. See Freeman, supra note 45, at 559.
83. Mulligan, supra note 29, at 1284.
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rating agencies' failure to recognize warning signs of trouble within
Enron, Congress neglected to provide any additional meaningful
oversight of credit rating agency operations." Credit rating
agencies themselves began to cast doubt on their initial rating
methods by downgrading a sizeable number of previously
investment-grade rated mortgage-backed securities.
Credit rating agencies are slow to downgrade their ratings
of financial products for much the same reason they give inflated
ratings to these products: they want to avoid invoking antagonism
from their primary clients - large investment banks.6 When these
mortgage-backed securities approach a default, a rating
downgrade may accelerate the default, resulting in even greater
losses to both issuers and investors.8 Thus, it is easy to see why
rating agencies, always mindful of the rating needs (and wants) of
their powerful clientele, would hesitate to downgrade securities
and risk losing market share."
C. Insufficient Resources Led to Cutting Corners in Assessing New
Financial Products
The rapid increase in demand for mortgage-backed
securities and CDOs in the early 2000s led rating agencies to
exploit the absence of meaningful regulation by pumping out
ratings to meet rising demand with little regard for accuracy.89 Not
only were rating agencies shielded from civil liability, but they also
had little competitive pressure to maintain their reputation within
the credit rating market with the Big Three controlling a dominant
stake in the marketplace."
84. See id.
85. See Barbara Black, Protecting the Retail Investor in an Age of Financial
Uncertainty, 35 DAYTON L. REv. 61, 68 (2009).
86. Piekarski, supra note 18, at 275.
87. See id. (stating this flows from the logical presumption that a rating
downgrade of a debt security will generally precipitate a fall in the market value of
that underlying debt security).
88. See id.
89. See Dennis, supra note 30, at 1133.
90. See id. (noting that since demand was so high for mortgage-backed securities
and CDOs at this time, the negative reputational cost of an inaccurate rating was an
insufficient deterrent compared to the benefit of generating quick profits).
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In 2001, Mr. Raiter, an employee of Moody's asking for
''collateral tapes" to assess the creditworthiness of home loans
backing a CDO, was met with this e-mailed response from the
managing director Richard Gugliada: "Any request for loan level
tapes is TOTALLY UNREASONABLE!!! Most investors don't
have it and can't provide it. Nevertheless we MUST produce a
credit estimate. . . . It is your responsibility to provide those credit
estimates and your responsibility to devise some method for doing
so. "91 This anecdote exemplifies how insufficient human resources
contributed to an overall absence of due diligence by rating
agencies in assessing these highly complex financial instruments.9
Despite a considerable increase in the number and complexity of
the mortgage-backed securities NRSROs were rating from 2002 to
2006, the SEC discovered at least two unidentified agencies that
failed to maintain staff increases to match their increases in deal
volume." They asked analysts to engage in willful ignorance by
assigning unmerited ratings to CDOs of subprime mortgage-
backed securities without having the necessary documentation or
time to make an accurate determination as to the underlying
default risk. 94 If an effective regulatory body for NRSRO activity
had been present, rating agencies would not have been tempted to
cut corners simply to generate more ratings for issuers, and
ultimately, more revenue for themselves.95
91. Hill, supra note 74, at 592 (quoting Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial
Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Oversight and Government Reform, 110th
Cong. (2008) (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Member, H. Comm. on
Oversight and Government Reform), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/Committee-on-Oversight/Credit
Agencies HearingHAW-Statement_10.22.08.pdf).
92. SEC SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 57, at 25 (finding that internal documents
within two rating agencies revealed a struggle to adapt human resources to the
growing number and complexity of the structured finance deals they were asked to
rate).
93. Id. at 12.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 17-20.
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D. Conflicts of Interest Inherent in the "Issuer Pays" Model
In most cases, the issuer of a security rated by an NRSRO
will directly compensate the rating agency that assigns the rating.96
The "issuer pays" model is especially problematic when
considering that the complex structured financial products behind
the subprime mortgage crisis, such as CDOs, were extremely
complicated and thus only issued by a small number of investment
banks." The "issuer pays" model was far less troublesome before
the advent of complex financial products as historically there were
a larger number of entities issuing traditional bonds. The larger
number of customers generating revenue for the rating agencies
prevented consolidation of market power in the hands of a few
customers, as is the case with investment banks in our present
financial system.99  Thus, refusing to grant investment bank
customers the highest rating possible for their structured financial
product could result in a rating agency losing one of its largest
sources of revenue.' In his remarks at the Dodd-Frank
Conference Committee on June 15, 2010, Rep. Brad Sherman (D -
California) likened the rating agencies to a baseball umpire and
the issuers to a home team paying that umpire $1 million per
game."0 "You can be sure the umpire would call balls and strikes
to secure future lucrative employment."102 This perversion led
rating agencies to lower their rating standards as analysts were
made aware of the business interests involved in each of the
products they were charged with analyzing. 0 3
Another conflict of interest arises when rating agencies
assist investment bank issuers in structuring these highly complex
96. Piekarski, supra note 18, at 273.
97. See id.
98. See Freeman, supra note 45, at 601.
99. See id.
100. Piekarski, supra note 18, at 273.
101. House-Senate Conference Committee Holds A Meeting On The Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 111th Cong. 74 (2010) [hereinafter Conference
Committee Hearing] (statement of Rep. Brad Sherman).
102. Id.
103. See SEC SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 57, at 25 (noting that analysts had
open communication with marketing personnel who would inform analysts when
their suggested rating would conflict with business interests).
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financial products.'04 "Rather than rating a security after the
structure of the tranches is determined, the rating agencies are
now actively engaged with the investment banks in determining
the proper structures to maximize ratings - thus lowering the
interest rate paid to investors and the resulting cost of capital.",o
Reports from insiders at rating agencies suggest that upper
management was unwilling to put resources into developing
updated methodologies to rate these new complex financial
products.106 Hopefully, following the passage of Dodd-Frank,
increased oversight will compel rating agencies to invest their
resources in the production of more reliable credit assessments for
investors.'*
IV. REGULATORY ACTION AND SHORT-TERM RATING AGENCY
REACTIONS
A. SEC Concept Release on Possible Rescission of SEC Rule
436(G)
In a 2009 concept release, the SEC sought comment on
whether or not it was still appropriate to exempt NRSROs from
civil liability under Sections 7 and 11 of the Securities Act via SEC
Rule 436(G).0 o Section 7 states that "experts" named as assisting
in the preparation or certification of a registration statement must
provide written consent to be filed by registrants in conjunction
with their registration statement.'" Section 11 holds an "expert"
liable for false, misleading, or omitted statements associated with
their respective contributions to the registration statement.o
104. See Freeman, supra note 45, at 602.
105. Id.
106. See Dennis, supra note 30, at 1125 ("[T]he models used to predict the loss
estimates for subprime mortgage-backed securities issued after 2002 failed to
anticipate the higher default rates associated with the increased securitization of non-
traditional subprime mortgage loans.").
107. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, sec. 932(a)(8), § 15E(p)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1877 (2010) (to be codified at
15 U.S.C. § 780-7).
108. See 2009 SEC Concept Release, supra note 77, at 53,114.
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2006) (These experts are traditionally accountants,
auditors, and lawyers who play an active role in preparing the registration statement).
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
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In 1977, the Commission published a concept release
addressing whether or not it would be appropriate to subject an
NRSRO to the consent requirements under Section 7, which
would subject the NRSRO to liability under Section 11."1 In that
release, the SEC also announced its consideration to now permit
disclosure of credit ratings in official documents filed with the
SEC.112  NRSROs indicated they would not consent to being
named in the registration statement due to uncertainty over the
scope of liability."' In a 1981 concept release, the SEC announced
a shift in pre-existing policies to permit inclusion of credit ratings
in registration statements."4 The SEC also proposed Rule 436(G),
providing that NRSROs would not be subject to Section 11
liability for inclusion of their credit ratings in a registration
statement.s The SEC enacted Rule 436(G) to allow issuers to
include NRSRO credit ratings in their registration statements,
while allaying the NRSROs fear of increased liability for
inaccurate ratings.' The SEC knew of the practical limits facing
issuers seeking NRSRO consent to inclusion of their ratings in
registration documents." At that time, the SEC felt that NRSROs
were already subject to sufficient liability under the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws."8 In 1982, the SEC officially
enacted rule 436(G)."9
In 2009, the SEC issued a concept release seeking comment
on the potential effects flowing from the rescission of Rule
436(G).120  The SEC cited four primary reasons in support of
rescinding Rule 436(G): (i) historical shift in the need for 436(G);
111. See Disclosure of Security Ratings, 42 Fed. Reg. 58414, 58414 (proposed Nov.
9, 1977) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239 & 249).
112. See id. at 58414
113. 2009 SEC Concept Release, supra note 77, at 53115.
114. Disclosure of Security Ratings in Registration Statements, 46 Fed. Reg.
42024, 42024 (proposed Aug. 18, 1981) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230)
[hereinafter 1981 SEC Concept Release].
115. Id. at 42024.
116. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. 11380 (proposed
Mar. 17, 1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 200, 201, 229, 230, 239, 240, 249, 250, 260,
& 274) [hereinafter 1982 SEC Concept Release].
117. Id.
118. 1981 SEC Concept Release, supra note 114.
119. 1982 SEC Concept Release, supra note 116.
120. See 2009 SEC Concept Release, supra note 77.
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(ii) investor reliance on "expert" NRSRO assessment; (iii) investor
protection and greater NRSRO accountability; and (iv)
elimination of the distinction between NRSROs and non-NRSRO
credit rating agencies.121 The SEC noted that, because disclosure
of credit ratings would now be required in registered documents,
the rationale of encouraging disclosure of credit ratings cited when
the rule was first passed was no longer relevant. 22
The SEC received both positive and negative feedback on
the possible rescission of Rule 436(G). 23 Those in support of the
rescission of the rule argued that rating agencies have managed to
escape accountability for inaccurate ratings as a result of their
preclusion from liability under Rule 436(G).124  Supporters of
rescinding Rule 436(G) liken ratings to other "expert" opinions
subjected to Section 11 liability, such as legal assessments or audit
reports. The rating agencies predictably provided negative
126
feedback on the proposed rule change. Moody's highlighted
that, unlike all other experts subject to Section 11 liability, rating
agencies do not participate in the preparation of the registration
statement, nor do they certify any representations made by the
issuer.27 Moody's also cautioned that increased exposure to
liability could force rating agencies to supply rating services
exclusively to more capitalized and creditworthy issuers that are
more capable of absorbing the increased built-in costs and less
121. See id. at 53,117-18.
122. See id. at 53,117.
123. See, e.g., Letter from Laurel Leitner, Senior Analyst, Council of Inst.
Investors, Comment on SEC Release No. 33-9071, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y,
Sec. and Exch. Comm. (Dec. 14, 2009), available at www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-
09/s72509-3.pdf and Letter from Michael Madelain, Chief Operating Officer,
Moody's Investors Service, Comment on SEC Release No. 33-9071, to Elizabeth M.




126. See generally Letter from Deven Sharma, President, Standard and Poor's,
Comment on SEC Release No. 33-9071, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, Sec. and
Exch. Comm. (Dec. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Sharma], available at
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-09/s72509-3.pdf.
127. See Letter from Michael Madelain, Chief Operating Officer, Moody's
Investors Service, Comment on SEC Release No. 33-9071, to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec'y, Sec. and Exch. Comm. (Dec. 14, 2009), available at www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
25-09/s72509-5.pdf.
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likely to default, thus limiting the ability of small to medium size
firms to obtain access to credit markets through the public offering
mechanism.'28
Although there is no direct statement by the SEC as to why
they declined to rescind Rule 436(G) following their concept
release, it is likely they wanted to avoid a potential freeze in the
issue of securities requiring NRSRO rating and consent, which
rating agencies said they would be unwilling to provide given the
uncertainty over their potential liability under Section 11.129 They
may have also desired to let Congress take action regarding an
expansion of NRSRO liability as "experts," as they gladly did with
the inclusion of Section 939G in Dodd-Frank.3 0
B. Dodd-Frank and the Rescission of Rule 436(G)
Congress mandated a broad range of new regulatory
measures pertaining to credit rating agencies in Dodd-Frank.13 1
This comprehensive law covers several functions and problems
with credit rating agencies such as: conflicts of interest in the
issuer-pays model, the need for increased accountability for
inaccurate ratings, and greater transparency in the ratings
process.3 2 This Note, however, will focus primarily on the
rescission of SEC Rule 436(G) and the corresponding expanded
liability for rating agencies.'13  Section 939G of Dodd-Frank
provides that Rule 436(G) of the Securities Act of 1933 "shall have
no force or effect," meaning that rating agencies can now be held
liable as "experts" for false or misleading ratings that could have
been avoided with a reasonable investigation.'
128. See Sharma, supra note 126.
129. See Anusha Shrivastava, Bond Sale? Don't Quote Us, Say Credit Firms, WALL
ST. J., July 21, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704723604575379650414337676.html.
130. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 939G, 124 Stat. 1376, 1890 (2010).
131. See generally id. sec. 932, § 15E (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78o-7) (outlining
several new regulatory goals and mandates applying to credit rating agencies and
their employees).
132. See id.




Congress found the services of rating agencies to be
"fundamentally commercial in nature," and therefore, should be
subject to the same standards of liability imposed upon auditors,
securities analysts, and investment bankers. In a June 15, 2010
House-Senate Conference Committee Hearing, lawmakers
weighed the pros and cons of rescinding Rule 436(G) and holding
NRSROs to a higher standard of liability for inaccurate credit
assessments.136 Proponents of the change felt that asking rating
agencies not to be grossly negligent in making credit assessments
seemed a fair burden to place on rating firms.37 Supporters of the
rescission also pointed to an Investors Working Group study
stating that the rescission of Rule 436(G) would make NRSROs
more accountable for their ratings and increase their diligence in
performing their credit risk analysis. 138 Rep. Mary Jo Kilroy (D-
Ohio) presented data on the overwhelming number of previously
AAA-rated securities backed by subprime mortgages rated in 2007
139
that have now been downgraded to junk status. Opponents of
the change accurately predicted the refusal by NRSROs to permit
their ratings to be used in registration statements and SEC
filings.'4 In particular, Senator Christopher Dodd posited that
NRSROs refusal to consent to inclusion of their ratings would
inevitably result in less information for investors, which runs
counter to the primary aims of the goals of Dodd-Frank. 141
Section 933 of Dodd-Frank will also loosen the pleading
standards in any future fraud action investors might pursue against
rating agencies.142 The new standard provides that pleading the
requisite state of mind now requires showing that the rating
135. Id. § 931 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78o-7).
136. Conference Committee Hearing, supra note 101.
137. Id. at 74 (statement of Rep. Mary Jo Kilroy).
138. Id. (statement of Rep. Mary Jo Kilroy).
139. Id. (statement of Rep. Mary Jo Kilroy) (indicating that junk status is below a
BBB- rating).
140. Id. at 70-71 (statement of Rep. Jeb Hensnarling).
141. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 933, 124 Stat. 1376, 1883-84 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78u-
4(b)(2)); see also Conference Committee Hearing, supra note 101, at 69 (statement of
Rep. Ed Royce) ("Whatever the vehicle, nothing will replace due diligence by
investors and institutions and regulators.").
142. Dodd-Frank Act § 933 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)).
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agencies "knowingly or recklessly" failed to base their ratings on
reasonable investigations or verifications of the issuer-supplied
data from independent sources.'4 3 Section 933, in conjunction with
the repeal of Rule 436(G) in Section 939G, will potentially make
rating agencies more vulnerable than ever to civil liability for
inaccurate ratgs."
C. Rating Agencies' Short Term Reactions
Rating agencies responded to the increased exposure to
civil liability by refusing to allow their ratings to be used in the
issuance of new financial products.14 5 Though the SEC avoided a
standstill in the asset-backed securities marketplace with their no-
action letter to Ford Credit, they will evaluate the best course of
action in relation to Rule 436(G) and heightened liability
standards for rating agencies.'" The repeal of SEC Rule 436(G)
has also led rating agencies to modify their contractual
arrangements with issuers of debt securities in an attempt to
further insulate themselves from exposure to liability from
aggrieved investors.147
Moody's use of indemnification clauses in its contracts with
bond and security issuers exemplifies one tool rating agencies may
use in the future to harbor themselves from civil liability.'"
Moody's claim the use of indemnification clauses in their
engagement letters with issuers is not a new practice.149 However,
the extent to which NRSROs are now seeking indemnification
appears greater than it had been prior to the enactment of Dodd-
Frank.o Rating agencies are now including much stronger
143. Id. § 933(b)(2)(B).
144. Id. § 939G.
145. July SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 2.
146. Nov SEC Order, supra note 10.
147. See Joyce, supra note 6.
148. See Marian Wang, Moody's Escapes SEC Lawsuit, Now Moves to Shield Itself
From Liability, PROPUBLICA BLOG, (Sep. 2, 2010, 11:36 AM),
http://current.com/1bvh74c.
149. See id.
150. See id. (commenting on the effect of increased liability for ratings in Dodd-
Frank on rating agencies' willingness to be named in registration statements, thus
exposing themselves to greater potential liability).
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language in their indemnification clauses with issuers, detailing all
of the legal costs and damages they would recover from issuers in
the event of a civil suit arising in relation to their credit rating
within a registration statement."' We have yet to see all of the
fallout from Dodd-Frank, but it is likely that rating agencies will
continue to avoid liability, leading to a potential freeze in the issue
of new securities requiring their NRSRO seal of approval should
the SEC ever decide to end its no-action position.15
V. FALLOUT FROM THE RESCISSION OF SEC RULE 436(G) IN
JANUARY OF 2011
A. Stagnant Bond and Asset-Backed Securities Markets
Congress intends for the rescission of SEC Rule 436(G) to
make ratings agencies more accountable for failures to perform
due diligence, ultimately rebuilding investor confidence in
NRSRO ratings and securities markets."' However, after Dodd-
Frank, rating agencies refused to consent to use of their ratings in
new bond issuances. 54 NRSRO refusal to consent to use of ratings
in prospectuses and initial security offerings restricted the market
for asset-backed securities because the SEC requires these
financial products to have NRSRO ratings included in their official
documents."' Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke voiced his concern
that this development could further stifle access to sources of
credit that is already difficult for private enterprise to secure in the
present conservative marketplace.
151. Dodd-Frank Wrinkle Reshapes Rating Process, SECURITIZATION.NET, (Aug.
6, 2010), http://www.securitization.netlarticle.asp?id=1&aid=9399.
152. See Nov. SEC Order, supra note 10 (referencing and extending the July 22,
2010 no-action letter issued on behalf of Ford Credit to the benefit of all issuers of
asset-backed securities).
153. See Conference Committee Hearing, supra note 101, at 69 (statement of Rep.
Ed Royce).
154. Nov. SEC Order, supra note 10.
155. Baker & McKenzie, The Repeal of Rule 436(g): Effects on the Asset-Backed
Securities Market 2 (Jul. 2010), available at
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/alnacsimplicationsusecreditratingsaugl0.
156. See Kevin Carmichael, One day in, Wall Street Overhaul Hits First Snag,
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Due to the NRSROs' unwillingness to consent to inclusion
of their ratings in registration statements, the Ford Motor Credit
Company found itself unable to comply with Regulation AB in
relation to a new issuance of asset-backed securities.' On July 22,
2010, Ford Motor Credit Company issued a written request to the
SEC to not recommend enforcement for their failure to include
ratings in their offering statements for a temporary time period.
To facilitate continued offerings of asset-backed securities, the
SEC issued a no-action letter that stated they would not
recommend enforcement action should an asset-backed issuer
omit the requisite rating disclosures from their registration
statements. 9 The SEC initially slated this temporary relief to
expire on January 24, 2011.'6 However, on November 23, 2010,
the SEC decided to extend the no-action position until further
notice so that it may assess the regulatory actions needed to fulfill
the goals of Dodd-Frank. In support of this decision, the SEC
acknowledged that had it not extended this relief, NRSROs would
not grant consent for their ratings to be included in registration
documents or prospectuses, rendering it impossible for offerings of
asset-backed securities to continue through registered channels.6 2
Part of the rationale supporting the SEC's decision to
extend no-action relief to asset-backed issuers stems from the
desire for these offerings to take place in the registered markets,
rather than through private market channels.16 ' NRSROs would
consent to inclusion of ratings used in offerings used in private
transactions, but not in those registered through the SEC, since
private offerings are exempt from Regulation AB requirements.'6




161. Nov. SEC Order, supra note 10 (referencing and extending the July 22, 2010
no-action letter issued on behalf of Ford Credit to the benefit of all issuers of asset-
backed securities).
162. Id.
163. See Sarah Mulholland, SEC Allows Asset-Backed Issuers to Omit Ratings
Required by Dodd-Frank Act, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 23, 2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-23/sec-allows-asset-backed-issuers-to-omit-
ratings-required-by-dodd-frank-act.html.
164. See Shrivastava, supra note 129; ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP,
FINANCIAL MARKETS UPDATE: SEC ADOPTS DODD-FRANK IMPLEMENTING
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Meredith Cross, director of the SEC's division of corporate
finance, stressed that the SEC felt better about allowing these
offerings to continue on registered markets as opposed to through
private channels.6 In a June 16, 2010 press release, Standard and
Poor's stated that, should Congress repeal Rule 436(G), it would
explore alternative avenues outside the registration statement to
continue supplying ratings for use in debt markets.16 Permitting
these offerings to move to the more expensive private market
would eliminate the protections afforded to investors through SEC
oversight, a result the SEC would like to avoid given the exigency
for investor protection following the recent financial crisis.167
B. Inefficient Allocation of Resources
Elevating credit agency liability for inaccurate ratings will
increase the time and effort necessary to rate a new security,
delaying the issue of securities requiring NRSRO ratings from
reaching the market1 6 In light of their new exposure to liability,
rating agencies will likely devote additional resources to lawyers
and analysts so they may find an optimal method to continue
providing rating services in the face of increased liability for their
credit assessments.169 Standard and Poor's noted elevated liability
will force litigation costs onto rating agencies, even if they are
ultimately successful in their defense.70 Rating agencies will likely
pass the increased transaction costs on to their customers, thereby
increasing the overall cost of rating services and potentially
171
diverting resources away from producing quality ratings.
Exposing the NRSROs to increased liability seems unfair
for those agencies performing the appropriate level of diligence in
making their rating determinations. Because investment-grade
REGULATIONS COVERING REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND REPURCHASES AND
POOL ASSET REVIEWS (2011), http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/3294.pdf.
165. Mulholland, supra note 163.
166. Shrivastava, supra note 129.
167. See id.
168. See Joyce, supra note 6.
169. See Mulligan, supra note 29, at 1297.
170. See generally Sharma, supra note 126.
171. See Mulligan, supra note 29, at 1297.
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ratings are optimistic "forward-looking opinions" on credit default
risk, rather than guarantees of repayment, investors with the
advantage of hindsight may be able to sue NRSROs for honestly
determined ratings prove inaccurate.17 Moody's highlighted its
concern that the crutch of a civil remedy may further decrease
investor due diligence and increase reliance on credit ratings.
Fear of civil liability may impel rating agencies to take greater care
and time in making their initial rating determination, thereby
reducing the benefit of their services to disseminate credit risk
information quickly to market participants. 7 4  In addition,
Standard and Poor's has indicated it may respond by undervaluing
initial credit default assessments; a tactic it feels will give it a
171
greater cushion to avoid litigation and downgrades. Increased
regulatory oversight of the NRSROs would encourage greater
accuracy and transparency in the rating process without unduly
limiting the ability of NRSROs to efficiently disseminate their
ratings to the investing public and keep credit markets flowing. 176
C. Unintended Impediment to New Rating Agencies
Although it is undisputed that the threat of liability could
impel rating agencies to provide more accurate ratings to
investors, rescission of Rule 436(G) may disproportionately hinder
the progress of smaller credit rating agencies that already face an
uphill battle for market share against the dominance of the Big
Three.17  Rescission of SEC Rule 436(G) means that both
172. STANDARD AND POOR'S Definitions, supra note 47.
173. See Madelain, supra note 123, at Sec. F (stating that investors with knowledge
of a civil remedy safety net will foster even greater over-reliance on ratings -
precisely what lawmakers have stated they would like to diminish).
174. See generally Sharma, supra note 126 (indicating that since NRSROs are not
involved in the structuring of the registration statement as are other experts, they are
not capable of providing a timely due diligence review of the registration document
to shield themselves from the liability arising from their consent to be named as an
expert).
175. See id.
176. See infra Part V.D.
177. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITrEES, GAO-10-782, ACrION NEEDED TO IMPROVE RATING AGENCY
REGISTRATION PROGRAM AND PERFORMANCE-RELATED DISCLOSURES 75 (2010)
(reporting that newer rating agencies may need years to build reputational capital
with institutional investors and reference to specific NRSROs in private contracts
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NRSROs and ratings agencies that are not NRSROs will face the
same potential liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act in
connection with any of their ratings used in official registration
statements.17 Thus, smaller rating agencies with fewer resources
may not be able to afford the transaction costs of drafting
indemnification agreements or defending their rating decisions in
protracted civil suits. 79
D. Alternative Solution: Increase Regulatory Oversight
Rather than miring down the securities market by
threatening NRSROs with private rights of action for inaccurate
default risk assessments, lawmakers should focus their regulatory
efforts on Dodd-Frank's broad grant of power to the SEC.8 In
conjunction with the rescission of SEC Rule 436(G), Dodd-Frank
also grants the SEC far greater regulatory authority to ensure
NRSRO compliance with the main goals of the Act: transparency
and accountability.181
Dodd-Frank establishes a new SEC Office of Credit
Ratings to administer prospective rules pertaining to NRSROs. 82
Dodd-Frank grants broad rule-making authority to this new arm of
the SEC to "issue such rules as may be necessary to carry out this
section." 83 The Office of Credit Ratings is to administer annual
examinations of each NRSRO to determine whether or not to
assess penal action for failure to comply with any of the goals of
Dodd-Frank.84 Through the Office of Credit Ratings, the SEC
could protect investors by maintaining its no-action position with
respect to the issuance of asset-backed securities, thereby refusing
to expose NRSROs to heightened liability standards for their
also prevents market penetration).
178. 2009 SEC Concept Release, supra note 77, at 53,117.
179. Id. at 53,118.
180. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 932, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872-83 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
7).
181. See id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7).
182. Dodd-Frank Act H§ 932(a)(8), 15E(p)(1) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 780-7).
183. Id. § 15E(p)(4)(B).
184. Thomas D. Gorman, Dodd-Frank.- Credit Rating Agencies, Part I, SEC
ACTIONS (Aug. 23, 2010, 2:26 AM) http://www.secactions.com/?p=2507.
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inaccurate ratings.18' An effective government watchdog with the
power to assess monetary fines and NRSRO registration-stripping
sanctions for inaccurate ratings should supplant increased liability
for NRSROs that would simply clog up dockets with a multitude
of incensed investors looking to recover for their losses on
inaccurately rated financial products.' Unlike civil lawsuits,
which only provide retroactive penalties, increased regulatory
oversight provides constant surveillance intended to prevent
unethical rating practices before they can harm investors.
Regulatory fines for irresponsible rating practices provide an
efficient substitute for civil liability by allowing for swifter penal
action while preventing potential lawsuits from further crowding
court dockets.*
VI. CONCLUSION
Instead of opening up the courtroom doors to aggrieved
investors looking to recover against the rating agencies for
detrimental reliance on ratings that resulted in failed investments,
regulators should look for ways to increase oversight and
transparency as a means to hold rating agencies more accountable
for their ratings.189 This would serve the dual purpose of both
insulating investors from inaccurate and careless ratings made by
rating agencies and preventing credit markets from suffocating in a
cloud of litigation.'" To facilitate credit access to issuers of asset-
backed securities, the SEC should maintain their no-action
position until such a time that either Regulation AB has been
amended or Dodd-Frank has been amended to exclude section
185. See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 932(a)(8), 15E(p)(1) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
780-7).
186. See id. § 932(a)(8).
187. Id. § 932(a)(8).
188. See DAVIS POLK & WARDELL LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL




189. See Black, supra note 85, at 77 ("For too long, policymakers have thought
that some investors are so smart that regulators should not stand in their way, for fear
of stifling innovation and investment opportunities.").
190. See Mulligan, supra note 29, at 1305.
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939G, thus repealing of SEC Rule 436(G).'9 ' Otherwise, rating
agencies have made it clear they will not consent to be named as
"experts" and supply their required rating for the registration
statement.'1' Until such a time that lawmakers can extricate rating
requirements from registration statements, the rating agencies will
undoubtedly use their leveraged position as the de facto
"gatekeeper" to the marketplace to ensure the continuation of the
SEC's no-action position. 193
The Office of Credit Ratings within the SEC, once
staffed, 94 will wield the power to assess monetary penalties on
rating agencies for irresponsible rating practices. 95 This should
provide rating agencies with a clear incentive to issue more
objective and accurate default predictions, and hinder their ability
to pump out inflated ratings to appease their client issuers and
maximize market share.'" Credit rating agencies should not be
punished merely because their ratings turn out to be "wrong,"
rather, they should be held accountable for failure to make a good
faith effort to calculate a reasonably accurate assessment of default
risk using relevant and impartial data. Congress must follow
through on Dodd-Frank's commitment to investor protection by
approving SEC funding to establish and staff the new Office of
Credit Ratings.'
The "Big Three" are deeply embedded in the operation of
global financial markets due to regulatory reliance on their credit
198ratings. Their "AAA" stamp of approval provides access to a
multitude of investments and investors within financial markets. "
191. See July SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 7.
192. Id.
193. Nov. SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 10.
194. See Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act: Dates to be Determined, SEC (Dec. 02, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/dates tobedetermined.shtml [hereinafter
SEC.gov Dates TBD] (listing the creation of the Office of Credit Ratings as one of
several SEC activities that have been temporarily put on hold for budgetary reasons).
195. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, sec. 932(a)(8), § 15E(p)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1877 (2010) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 780-7).
196. See id.
197. See SEC.gov Dates TBD, supra note 194.
198. See Mulligan, supra note 29, at 1304-05.
199. See Hosp, supra note 37, at 553 (highlighting the regulatory encouragement of
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Because the "gatekeeper" function of the rating agencies does not
seem to have a viable replacement in the short term, regulators
must increase their efforts to adhere to the commitments made in
the body of Dodd-Frank - to increase the regulation,
accountability, and transparency of NRSRO operations.200
BENJAMIN H. BROWNLOW
demand for credit rating services by requiring investors to gain a "AAA" rating
before becoming eligible for certain government loan assistance programs, such as
the "Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility," which provides that the Federal
Reserve will lend money to holders of asset-backed securities if that instrument held
a rating of "AAA" or higher).
200. See Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 932, §15E (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780-7).
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